So, anyone still think that having an ADIZ around the DC area is a useful and important thing? Anyone still think that it does anything except unfairly restrict the people who already obey the laws and who aren't the problem? Nice to see that the pilots have been right all along. Translations in Italics
Plane That Caused Capitol Evacuation Nearly Shot Down
Plane caught us with our pants down during a high security event because we thought that merely passing a law would be enough. Note that we said "nearly" because it actually would have reached the Capitol before we figured out what was up.
By Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 8, 2004; Page A01
The top general at the North American Aerospace Defense
Command was on the telephone and prepared to order an F-16
fighter to shoot down an unidentified plane that turned out
to be carrying the governor of Kentucky to former president
Ronald Reagan's funeral last month, according to two federal
security officials briefed separately about the incident.
We became confused because we couldn't figure out that someone on an approved FAA flight plan, was not a threat because he was doing exactly what he was told.
The tense incident June 9 ended after the twin-engine Beechcraft
King Air carrying Gov. Ernie Fletcher (R) turned to land at
Reagan National Airport. But the close call caused officials
to reassess safeguards for the airspace around Washington and
prompted calls to expand the no-fly zone beyond its current
16-mile radius.
As usual, when presented with something that doesn't work, we decide to make it bigger, so that it STILL doesn't work, but it costs more money
Although many planes have violated restrictions imposed after
the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the June 9 episode was
extraordinary because the aircraft penetrated so deeply into
the no-fly zone during a high-security event and remained
unidentified to air defense officials for several critical
minutes. Current and former homeland security officials said
the incident was a significant security breakdown.
This actually means that air defense officials STILL have not learned how to communicate with air traffic control and assess a threat as opposed to a legitimate user of the thusfar free air traffic control system
The episode, described by some officials as the closest the
government has come to downing a civilian plane over Washington
since Sept. 11, 2001, will be the subject of two hearings on
Capitol Hill today. Civil aviation officials will testify before
a House subcommittee on aviation, and military officials have
been invited to a classified briefing before the House Armed
Services and Homeland Security committees.
In other words, let's almost shoot the Governor of Kentucky rather than check with Air Traffic Control, and then let's have a hearing where we don't even invite ATC, or "normal pilots" while we run in circles to make things even worse.
"Even without the communications breakdowns involved in
Governor Fletcher's flight, serious questions remain about
the adequacy of our air defense system," said Rep. Jim Turner
(Tex.), ranking Democrat on the House Select Committee on
Homeland Security. "Does the existing no-fly zone around our
nation's capital give sufficient time to intercept a terrorist
controlled flight?"
No, it doesn't, and guess what? Making it bigger won't change the simple fact that without shutting down any flights to Dulles, National, or BWI, and all general aviation fields throughout Maryland and Virginia, that fact will not change.
A spokesman for the commander of NORAD, Air Force Gen. Ralph
E. "Ed" Eberhart, would not comment on the handling of the
incident, saying that rules of engagement are classified. But
he and others pointed out that protocols were followed and that
the air defense system as a whole is providing unprecedented
security.
But wouldn't say that the aircraft, if it made a lawn dart approach into National (without flying the prescribed approach while being directed by ATC) could have veered slightly and taken out the White House, as could any aircraft flying into that airport.
"The fact that the plane landed without incident June 9
indicates that interagency coordination procedures developed
since 9/11 work," said the spokesman, Michael Kucharek.
In other words, we were pretty damn lucky that we didn't blow up the aircraft, the governor, and take out several people on the ground
A reconstruction, based in part on interviews with officials
who spoke on condition they not be named, has revealed new
details. Senior officials at two federal agencies who are
familiar with how the air defense system worked that day said
a fighter plane sent to intercept Fletcher's plane initially
could not make visual contact because of cloud cover.
Gee, you're saying that unless it's a beautifully clear day, I might get shot down despite following ATC instructions to the letter? How wonderful. I just feel SO safe.
As a result, Eberhart did not issue the order to shoot down
Fletcher's plane, according to the two officials, as well
as a third government official who was briefed later on the
incident. Interviews and a timeline prepared by congressional
investigators also show that Fletcher's plane turned to land
before it was identified.
Before it was identified by WHOM? Air Traffic Control already knew who it was. Why not just ASK them?
"They had the general on the phone, and he was in position
to make the call. . . . This was the closest we have come to
making that difficult decision, triggering a chain of events
that could be pretty horrific," one official said.
Triggering a chain of events that would reveal how woefully stupid the entire system of "defending the Capitol area" truly is.
The air defense system for Washington is unique, and many of its operations are classified. Classified so that nobody will laugh hysterically Unveiled in January 2003, the system was created to track all flights and to intercept
aircraft that do not follow strict protocols. despite the fact that this aircraft DID follow all protocols It replaced the fighter patrols that guarded the nation's capital beginning Sept. 11, 2001, a defense that was costly and did not provide federal authorities with the tools to investigate whether there were patterns in the violations. And they might find that the only pattern in the violations is that most of the aircrafts were following ATC instructions
The defense system includes a no-fly zone that bars most air
traffic from a ring that extends 16 miles from the Washington
Monument -- the major exception being commercial flights to and
from National Airport. A larger restricted zone, the D.C. Air
Defense Identification Zone, extends to about 50 miles from
Washington and requires pilots to identify their aircraft,
activate identification beacons and stay in two-way radio
contact with air controllers.
And they think that something bigger would be better? Does it make sense that commercial traffic is not restricted and can be used as a much bigger "bomb" than any of our Cessna and Piper single engine planes.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement helicopters and Cessna
jets patrol the zone unarmed, while air defense artillery
on the ground and fighter jets on alert or on irregular air
patrols are poised to intercept an intruder.
And they expect that is going to work? Can they figure out that the current system is broken by being both too restrictive and useless at the same time?
On June 9, the Beechcraft King Air was flying with a broken
transponder, a device that transmits an identifying signal
picked up by ground controllers. After takeoff, the pilot, as
required, notified Federal Aviation Administration officials
in Ohio about the problem at 2:56 p.m.
Broken transponder? And they were allowed to depart the area? Why would the FAA allow an aircraft going to the most restricted airport in the country, fly around a defense zone with a broken transponder? Once they realized their mistake, why didn't they track the primary target better, and inform others of what was happening? Oh yeah, I remember....they're the FAA. Silly questions.
But the FAA failed to notify military and homeland security
officials, who monitored separate radar displays, about the
broken transponder. To everyone but the FAA, radar showed an
unidentified intruder entering restricted Washington airspace
at 4:24 p.m.
And nobody bothered to call anyone else and get the real story.
At 4:31, with the plane a minute or two from downtown
Washington, officials ordered the evacuation of the
U.S. Capitol, where thousands had gathered to await the arrival
of Reagan's coffin. The FAA reported to air defense authorities
that it was in contact with the plane three minutes later,
as the aircraft made the final approach to National Airport.
That's a neat trick. Evacuate the Capitol in 1 to 2 minutes? That's quite amusing. So let's see....3 minutes later, FAA finally tells the air defense authorities. That's one minute too late, eh?
The Beechcraft was traveling at roughly 240 miles per hour,
or four miles a minute. At that speed, it could have reached
the center of the no-fly zone in four minutes.
Makes no sense if it was one to two minutes from downtown, since the center of the no-fly zone is the Washington Monument, and flying at 240 miles per hour....you do the math.
Customs officials said it took their Black Hawk helicopter four
minutes to launch that afternoon, quicker than the designated
scramble time. Military fighters happened to be on intermittent
air patrols that day, but their standard scramble time from
the ground is 15 minutes.
Looks like another case of 2 minutes too late. Let's see....Blackhawk takes off after 4 minutes...then has to find the target, then has to ready aim and fire, etc. So the "standard" time is 15 minutes? Looks to me like 11 minutes too late.
For security officials, a key factor is how little time they had
to identify Fletcher's aircraft and make critical decisions. One
senior federal security official who has studied the incident
said the chances of shooting down the plane would have been
"50-50" given the time sequence.
Ring ring....Potomac approach control? Who is that unnamed aircraft? Oh, that's it's tail number. A database search says it's the Governor of Kentucky. Great. Thanks very much. *click*
The official said the current system is prepared to stop
a second assault, as was the case Sept. 11, not a first
attack. Expanding the restricted flight zone -- or a more
radical move, such as closing National Airport -- would be
required to provide a greater level of security, he said.
Sort of like the "dog gets one bite" rule? Makes lots of sense. NOT! Let's let the aircraft crash into the Capitol with a good 5,000 people outside lining up to see Reagan's pine box. But that's ok...cuz we're prepared against the second aircraft which might dent the White House front door like the last Cessna hitting it did.
Some House investigators are pushing the Transportation Security
Administration to improve coordination between a half-dozen
agencies. Officials at the TSA and the Pentagon have revived
calls for the FAA to expand the restricted flight zones,
which would build in more time to make and execute decisions.
No it would not. Not unless you shut down air traffic completely to the area, which the Senators and Congress critters would not allow. Not to mention would result in the basic evisceration of the entire General Aviation economy in the DC area along with all of the jobs that would be lost, the virtual "taking" of all of the aircraft in the area, etc. etc.
Close calls in the past have prompted changes. On June 19,
2002, a Cessna flew over the capital area before it could
be intercepted, prompting the evacuation of Vice President
Cheney from the White House. Military officials at the time
acknowledged that aircraft could reach targets in Washington
before they were intercepted by fighters on ground alert.
Authority for air patrols to shoot down a civilian aircraft,
once limited to the president, has been delegated to
the secretary of defense and his deputy; to Eberhart,
as NORAD commander; and to the commander of NORAD's
continental U.S. region in Florida, Air Force Maj. Gen. Craig
R. McKinley. McKinley has said orders to shoot down aircraft
are practiced "probably eight to 15 times a week."
A senior federal security official said the process involved
in firing ground-based air defenses operated by the Army or
Army National Guard is more complex and needs refinement. Some
military officials initially questioned the value of installing
short-range missile systems, saying the range and reaction
time made their use unlikely.
Why not install something like....uh...a telephone?
Customs agents with submachine guns are trained to shoot from
the Black Hawks and have authority to use lethal force if their
lives or the lives of others are endangered, said Charles
E. Stallworth II, director of air and marine operations for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Their bosses, however, are not trained in use of telephones.
Homeland security officials, although aware of limitations,
say the system in place is working well and has added layers
of protection unavailable on Sept. 11, 2001.
But they still haven't installed communications to ATC. Hmmm.
Randy Beardsworth, head of the Department of Homeland Security
directorate that includes the TSA and customs enforcement,
said advanced radar, computer databases and other tools used
by the multi-agency system provide an unprecedented early
warning system.
Unlike telephones, which cost a lot less and they could get less government funding for. Oh dear.
More than 2,000 aircraft "of interest" have been detected over
Washington airspace since January 2003, Beardsworth said. The
number of aircraft violating the no-fly zone fell from 164
in the six months before Jan. 20, 2003, to 30 after that date
through May, 14, 2004.
Mostly due to pilots getting fed up with the entire system and not flying much anymore.
All 30 intruders were successfully identified, Beardsworth
said. By comparison, another federal official said that two
years ago, military jets could identify and intercept only
about 40 percent of intruders in training drills.
Wouldn't it be nice if the military jets were equipped with radios with civilian air frequencies, so that the jet pilots could actually CONTACT the targeted aircraft and try to find out why they are, or at least inform them that they are being intercepted? Yes, that's right....most intercepted aircraft who have reported to other pilot groups say that the intercepting jets have made no attempt to make radio contact on either emergency or other frequencies, causing the intercepted aircraft operator to become completely confused in an already tense and dangerous situation.
Beardsworth, however, said he does not disagree with those
who say the system may not be geared to stop a determined
attacker. Like other security officials, he noted that the
system's limits are forced by political compromises between
security and civilian aviation interests.
The system's limits are forced by practical compromises between constitutional freedom, and a false sense of security.
Beardsworth said that shooting down hostile aircraft is the
responsibility of the Defense Department, not his agency.
"It's not my fault, man
"Our role is to help them by having a clear picture when they
have to make that tough decision," he said. "Can you imagine
how much tougher the decision would be if you didn't have the
ability to deter small craft from coming in, if you didn't
have the ability to fly out there, detect, identify and deter?"